Psychology and Deterrence
“Psychology and Deterrence” by Robert Jervis, published by JHU Press in 1985, is a reprint edition comprising 270 pages. This book explores the complexities of deterrence as a fundamental concept in American foreign policy, highlighting its frequent failures and the potential increase in war risks. Jervis examines the simplistic assumptions underlying deterrence strategies, particularly regarding power, aggression, and decision-making in international relations.
Readers will find a thorough analysis that incorporates historical evidence through a psychological lens, featuring case studies on significant conflicts such as World War I, the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Falklands Wars. Jervis argues that national leaders often exhibit behaviors that contradict theoretical predictions, revealing a mix of caution and recklessness. The book discusses how deterrence strategies can inadvertently heighten insecurity, leading to the very actions they aim to prevent. This examination provides valuable insights into military policy, international security, and the psychological factors influencing political decision-making.
Official synopsis Publisher
Detterence is the most basic concept in American foreign policy today. But past practice indicates it often fails to work – and may increase the risk of war. Psychology and Deterrence reveals this stratgy’s hidden and generally simplistic assumptions about the nature of power and aggression, threat and response, and calculation and behavior in the international arena.
Most current analysis, the authors, note, ignore decisionmakers’ emotions, preceptions, and domestic political needs, assuming instead that people repond to crisis in highly rational ways. Examining the historical evidence from a psychological perspective, Psychology and Deterrence offers case studies on the origins of World War I, the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Falklands Wars as seen by the most important participants.
These case studies reveal national leaders to be both more cautious and more reckless than theory would predict. They also show how deterrence strategies often backfire by aggravating a nation’s sense of insequrity, thereby calling forth the very behavior they seek to prevent. The authors’ conclusions offer important insights for superpower bargaining and nuclear deterrence.
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