Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination
“Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination” by David A. Currie, published by Cambridge University Press on August 12, 1993, is a comprehensive exploration of macroeconomic policy in open economies. This first edition, comprising 430 pages, delves into the design and conduct of macroeconomic policies, utilizing neo-Keynesian models that highlight the short-term real effects of monetary and fiscal policy. The authors, David Currie and Paul Levine, examine various aspects of active stabilization policies, addressing the merits of simple policy rules and the complexities of policy design amid uncertainty and the need for international coordination.
Readers will find a thorough analysis of credibility and the significance of a policy-maker’s reputation in adhering to announced policies. The book integrates these themes with coordination issues, offering a unique synthesis of concepts. It employs optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to explore the interactions between governments and a rational private sector. This work is particularly relevant for students and educators in open economy macroeconomics, as well as professional economists interested in applying macroeconomic models to policy design.
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In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker’s reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.
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