Game Theory for Applied Econometricians Data Analytics with R

Cover — Half Title — Series Page — Title Page — Copyright Page — Contents — Introduction — I. Static Games of Complete Information — 1. Games — 1.1. Introduction — 1.2. Some Strategic Situations — 1.2.1. Aliens Attack! — 1.2.2. Can AI Cope with Traffic? — 1.3. End of Skyjacking — 1.3.1. More Security? — 1.3.2. Hijacking Data using R — 1.3.3. United Arlines Flight 93 — 1.4. A Game — 1.4.1. Definitions — 1.4.2. Examples — 1.5. Prisoner’s Dilemma — 1.5.1. The Game — 1.5.2. What is the Best Outcome? — 1.5.3. What should You Do? — 1.5.4. Does This Make Sense? — 1.6. Empirical Analysis: Friend or Foe using R — 1.6.1. Trust Box — 1.6.2. Data Analysis in R — 1.6.3. Analysis in R — 1.7. Discussion and Further Reading — 2. Nash Equilibrium — 2.1. Introduction — 2.2. What is a Nash Equilibrium? — 2.2.1. Dominance — 2.2.2. Prisoner’s Dilemma — 2.2.3. Coordination Game — 2.3. Nash Equilibrium — 2.3.1. Definition — 2.3.2. Algorithm for Finding Nash Equilibrium — 2.3.3. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game — 2.3.4. Coordination Game — 2.4. Entry Games — 2.4.1. Bresnahan and Reiss — 2.4.2. Two Firm Entry Game — 2.4.3. Many Firm Entry Game — 2.4.4. Nash Equilibrium — 2.4.5. Fixed Cost of Entry — 2.4.6. Equilibrium Number of Firms — 2.4.7. Simulation of Entry Game in R — 2.5. Empirical Analysis: Tire Markets using R — 2.5.1. Data — 2.5.2. Structural Model — 2.5.3. Entry Estimator — 2.5.4. Estimation in R — 2.5.5. Structural Estimation — 2.5.6. Policy Simulation in R — 2.6. Discussion and Further Reading — 3. Oligopoly — 3.1. Introduction — 3.2. Cournot’s Model — 3.2.1. Two Firm Model — 3.2.2. Best Response — 3.2.3. Nash Equilibrium — 3.2.4. Cournot Model with N Firms — 3.2.5. Cournot Model in R — 3.2.6. Solve for the Nash Equilibrium with R — 3.2.7. Simulation of Cournot Model in R — 3.3. Bertrand’s Model.