Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic
Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic by Russell Hurlburt, published by MIT Press on August 19, 2011, is a thought-provoking exploration of the reliability of introspection in reporting conscious experiences. This reprint edition spans 336 pages and delves into a dialogue between a psychologist and a philosopher who hold opposing views on the accuracy of self-reported inner experiences. The book centers around the case of a subject named “Melanie,” who shares her conscious experiences through the Descriptive Experience Sampling method, prompting a critical examination of how well individuals can articulate their sensory experiences, emotions, and inner thoughts.
Readers will find a detailed discussion that balances the perspectives of Hurlburt and philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, as they analyze Melanie’s accounts and the implications for the scientific study of consciousness. The book not only presents their differing opinions but also illustrates a collaborative effort to refine their arguments, moving beyond mere debate to a nuanced understanding of introspection’s potential and limitations. Transcripts and audio files of the interviews are available on the MIT Press website, enhancing the reader’s engagement with the material. This work contributes to the fields of psychology, cognitive psychology, and philosophy, making it a significant addition to the discourse on human consciousness.
Official synopsis Publisher
A psychologist and a philosopher with opposing viewpoints discuss the extent to which it is possible to report accurately on our own conscious experience, considering both the reliability of introspection in general and the particular self-reported inner experiences of “Melanie,” a subject interviewed using the Descriptive Experience Sampling method.
Can conscious experience be described accurately? Can we give reliable accounts of our sensory experiences and pains, our inner speech and imagery, our felt emotions? The question is central not only to our humanistic understanding of who we are but also to the burgeoning scientific field of consciousness studies. The two authors of Describing Inner Experience disagree on the answer: Russell Hurlburt, a psychologist, argues that improved methods of introspective reporting make accurate accounts of inner experience possible; Eric Schwitzgebel, a philosopher, believes that any introspective reporting is inevitably prone to error. In this book the two discuss to what extent it is possible to describe our inner experience accurately.
Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel recruited a subject, “Melanie,” to report on her conscious experience using Hurlburt’s Descriptive Experience Sampling method (in which the subject is cued by random beeps to describe her conscious experience). The heart of the book is Melanie’s accounts, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel’s interviews with her, and their subsequent discussions while studying the transcripts of the interviews. In this way the authors’ dispute about the general reliability of introspective reporting is steadily tempered by specific debates about the extent to which Melanie’s particular reports are believable. Transcripts and audio files of the interviews will be available on the MIT Press website.
Describing Inner Experience? is not so much a debate as it is a collaboration, with each author seeking to refine his position and to replace partisanship with balanced critical judgment. The result is an illumination of major issues in the study of consciousness—from two sides at once.
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