Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak

Cover of Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak by Richard N. Armstrong
Year: 2004
Language: en
Pages: 72
ISBN-13: 9781410217509
ISBN-10: 1410217507
Dimensions:
Height: 9 Inches
Length: 6 Inches
Weight: 0.26014546916 Pounds
Width: 0.17 Inches
Dewey Decimal: 940.54/21
Editorial overview Touché

Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak by Richard N. Armstrong, published by University Press of the Pacific in October 2004, is a concise examination of the strategic role of operational deception in the Red Army’s victories during World War II. This 72-page study highlights how the Soviet Army effectively utilized deception tactics, particularly during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation in July 1944, a crucial period in military history. The text is presented in English and offers insights into the planning and resource allocation that underpinned these deceptive measures.

Readers will find a detailed analysis of the operational level deception that contributed to Soviet successes on the battlefield. Armstrong’s work delves into the methodologies employed by the Red Army, emphasizing the significance of deception in military operations. The study aligns with broader themes in military science and history, particularly regarding the technological and strategic innovations that shaped warfare during this era. This edition serves as a valuable resource for those interested in the complexities of military strategy and the historical context of World War II.


Official synopsis Publisher

The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong. examines the role of operational deception in the Red Army’s World War II victories. This Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception measures used during battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong’s insightful study demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception and Soviet battlefield success. Richard M. Swain Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute

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This page includes the available description and bibliographic details for “Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak” by Richard N. Armstrong. Synopsis preview: The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely…
Who is the author of “Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak”?
“Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak” is credited to Richard N. Armstrong.
When was “Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak” published?
Publisher: University Press of the Pacific. Year: 2004.
What is the ISBN for “Soviet Operational Deception The Red Cloak”?
ISBN-13: 9781410217509. ISBN-10: 1410217507.
What are the book details (language, pages, edition)?
Language: en. Pages: 72.

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